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Abstract
With directives to deliver impartial news, current affairs and programmes, the social 
responsibility of media, mainly public service broadcasters (PSBs), is viewed as providing 
resources for serving democracy and full citizenship. Through these resources, public service 
broadcasting (PSB) builds the trust of the public in its public service values. However, 
the continuance of this public trust requires evidence of independence and adherence to 
institutional norms beyond the reach of vested interests — corporate and party political. This 
paper1 aims to investigate critical challenges facing the independence of PSBs to uncover 
the significance of balanced co-existence of two aspects of independence — de jure and de 
facto — in the PSB sector. The main argument of the paper is that the disparity between the 
two elements of independence is widening due to vested interests. And narrowing of such 
gaps is vital for PSBs to serve the public interest.
1 - This article is based on three chapters of the unpublished MA (Research) thesis titled–De jure and De facto Inde-
pendence of Public Service Broadcasters.
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Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR)2 
in the media industries falls within the 
boundaries of its products as information 
goods that could affect the mental and 
emotional activity of people (Jung, 2009). 
For this reason, the development of social 
responsibilities of media organisations, 
especially public service broadcasters 
(PSBs)3, is particularly intriguing (Gulyás, 
2009, p. 659). Public service broadcasting 
(PSB) system is chosen because of its unique 
responsibility to operate independently of 
those holding economic and political power 
as it belongs to the public. Independence is 
necessary for delivering resources for full 
citizenship, i.e. impartial information, news 
and current affairs, culture, education and 
entertainment. 
Independence is also crucial for enhancing 
social, political and cultural citizenship; creating 
“informed and enlightened democracy” 
(Jacka, 2002, p. 330) and promoting social 
cohesion (Council of Europe, 2004).  But this 
sociability in broadcasting is questioned by 
Morley (2000, p. 110) arguing that each 
programme conveys signals that appeal to 
certain parts of the audience, inviting them 
to take part in the social life while at the 
same time signalling to other groups that 
this programme is not for them. Thus, he 
questions the idea of “addressing all citizens” 
and the everyday reality of PSB as being able 
to bridge all cultural and social differences 
demarcating class, gender or generations in 
any programme (Morley, 2000, p. 110).  In 
this light, it is argued that he challenges the 
fundamental values of PSB such as fairness, 
accuracy and impartiality, which dispute the 
independence of PSBs.
Independence is perhaps the most critical 
attribute of the PSB system, and crucial to 
achieving primary aims: universal access, 
diversity of perspectives and freedom from 
vested interests (Arendt, 1958; Keane, 
1991). Geradin and Petit (2004, p. 49) 
describe independence as “the absence 
of pressures from political and industry 
interests.” As an institutional principle 
for PSB, independence implies minimum 
interference by the state and the market 
(Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 189). Interference 
is minimised so that public service 
institutions can accomplish their mission 
of serving the public interest through their 
full professional autonomy (Klimkiewicz, 
2013, p. 189). This professional autonomy 
may best be defended through the board 
of directors (B.O.D)4, the parliamentary 
legislation such as broadcasting charters 
and Media Regulatory Authorities (MRAs) 
of public service media PSM5/PSB such 
as the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (ACMA) or The Office of 
Communication (Ofcom) in the United 
Kingdom (UK).
Furthermore, when the concept of 
independence is used about PSB/PSM 
and MRA (Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 189), it 
can be used interchangeably with the word 
“autonomy”. The concept of autonomy, as 
mentioned by Dreyer (2013, p. 121) comes 
in two forms:
a) the first one is “the level of decision-
making competencies of the agency”;
2 - CSR was referred to as just “Social Responsibility” in the period before the rise and dominance of the corporate 
form of business organization (Carroll, 2008, p. 1).
3 - In this paper, occasional references have been made to Australia’s public service broadcaster–ABC (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation) and UK’s public service broadcaster–BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) while making 
arguments regarding public service broadcasting. 
4 - Board of Directors will be referred as the board in this article.
5 - PSB has gained incredible acceptance in both developing and developed countries around the world. In parallel, the 
concept of social media and its role in widening the impact of PSB is receiving attention as a critical catalytic force in 
converting PSB to PSM. In this context, the term Public Service Media is used in place of Public Service Broadcaster/
ing, in this article, at all occasions where all the portals of PSB, i.e. television, radio as well as online portals are referred. 
From here on, it shall be referred as PSM/PSB.
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b) the second one is “the exemption of 
constraints on the actual use of decision-
making competencies of the agency.”
Therefore, these two forms of autonomy can 
also be called de jure or formal independence 
and de facto or factual independence 
respectively. Various scholars have presented 
their opinions on the relationship between 
these two sides of independence and the 
factors that create disparity in this connection. 
In continuation, this article mentions that, in 
the field of PSB, the gap between the two 
aspects of independence is widening due 
to political and economic interventions. The 
primary research objective of this paper is to 
establish the significance of the harmonious 
existence of de jure and de facto aspects 
of independence in PSB sector. It analyses 
how these gaps might be better managed 
or minimised which is essential for the 
independent existence and accountability 
of PSBs towards their public. 
This article is divided into three parts. 
The first part mentions the traditional 
concept of PSB and its social and cultural 
dimensions, the rise of neo-liberalism, 
its effects on the relationship of PSBs 
to their complex interactive audience 
and their independence. The concept of 
independence is explored in the second 
part of this paper. A discussion of this idea 
is taken up as an essential attribute of PSB 
along with evaluating the dimensions of 
the two aspects of independence de jure 
and de facto. Such an evaluation is required 
for listing the factors, such as party system 
polarisation and size of the markets that 
create gaps between these two aspects, 
which ultimately affects the accountability 
and performance of PSBs. The last part 
synthesises the discussions of section 
one, and two for establishing that 
“independence is must for PSBs for offering 
a publicly funded platform for citizens and 
audience to interact with one another and 
their society at large” (Sharma, 2015). This 
part presents recommendations about 
how these gaps between de jure and de 
facto aspects of PSBs’ independence 
might be reduced. Narrowing of this 
disparity is imperative for independent 
PSB systems for conducting “independent 
corporate operations, professing corporate 
values of honesty, fairness, independence 
and respect” as their social responsibility 
(ABC House Committee, 2014).
Part 1:
Public Service Broadcasting: 
Social, Cultural and Political
Contributions
PSB is commonly regarded to be one of the 
most influential tools for promoting citizens’ 
democratic participation (UNESCO, 2005, 
p. 6). It is also widely discussed as a means 
of disseminating information, analysis and 
diverse viewpoints to the public, which 
contributes in forming a constructive 
public opinion (Murdock, 1992; Collins, 
2007; Debrett, 2010). Explaining the role 
of the “public” of PSB, Rumphorst (1998, 
p. 6) noted that “the public is not only the 
beneficiary of PSB and its paymaster but 
also its controller. It is only consistent, and 
it could not be any other way”.
It is not easy to define the concept of PSB. 
For the most part, it means broadcasting 
funded by the public purse that should 
produce news and education (Born, 2004, 
p. 79). United Nations Educational Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
described PSB as broadcasting made, 
financed and controlled by the public, for 
the people. It is neither commercial nor 
state-owned, free from political interference 
and pressure from market forces. Through 
[public service broadcasting], citizens are 
informed, educated and entertained. When 
guaranteed with pluralism, programming 
diversity, editorial independence, appropriate 
funding, accountability and transparency, 
public service broadcasting can serve as a 
cornerstone of democracy (2005, p. 13).
It is implied in UNESCO’s definition of PSB 
that while PSB systems are held in state 
ownership for the benefit of the public, they 
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are protected from political interference 
through their governance policies and the 
legislative framework in which they operate. 
Those PSBs that are non-commercial, 
such as Britain’s British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and Australia’s Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), are also free 
from the commercial pressures associated 
with selling airtime to advertisers. Taking a 
broader perspective, various other scholars 
define PSB as a “technology of citizenship” 
(Foucauldian approach) (Foucault et al, 1991) 
that provides the basis for the proposition 
that contemporary formations of citizenship 
are shaped by interactions between different 
authorities and the different ways in which 
they define “the public” (Nolan, 2006, p. 227).
Furthermore, the BBC early established 
what became universal goals for PSB 
- “to inform, educate and entertain.” In 
addition to these three basic objectives, the 
chairman of the ABC, Hon James Spigelman 
(2012), AC QC, while speaking at the RIPE 
Conference in Sydney in 2012, proposed 
one more element “… a public broadcaster 
should interact with his audiences”. The 
literature in which this research is grounded 
offers ongoing discussion and debate about 
the public interest justifications for and 
continuing relevance of the interventionist 
PSB system, and of independence — from 
government and vested interests — a key 
rationale for PSB that also underpins the 
other rationales as well. However, among 
the eight rationales of PSB, as identified by 
the BBC’s Research Unit (Lawrence & BFI, 
1986), the sixth rationale – “detachment 
from all vested interests and government 
to maintain editorial independence and 
freedom of expression in broadcasting” 
informs the central focus of this paper. 
Rationales for 
Public Service Broadcasting
Many PSBs are based on fundamental 
established principles: universality of 
service, impartiality and freedom from 
vested interests, diversity in programming, 
provision for minority audiences and 
information for an engaged electorate 
(Price & Raboy, 2003, p. 6). 
In 1985, a Committee on Financing the BBC 
was established under the chairmanship 
of Professor Alan Peacock, to investigate 
the funding of the BBC, particularly the 
possibility of replacing the license fee with a 
subscription service. This recommendation 
was made by this committee, based upon 
expectations of Mrs Thatcher during the 
conservative Thatcher government, but 
was never implemented (Graham, 2005, 
p.79). It prompted the BBC to call upon its 
Broadcasting Research Unit (BRU) to justify 
its license fee funding system. Under the 
chairmanship of Richard Hoggart, the BRU 
assessed both commercial and PSBs to 
differentiate PSB, producing a booklet: The 
Public Service Idea in British Broadcasting: 
Main Principles (Lawrence & BFI, 1986). 
This booklet identified the following 
eight principles or the rationales of PSB 
that have been taken up by scholars as 
a starting point for analysing the value 
of PSB (Banerjee & Seneviratne, 2006; 
Franklin, 2001):
- Geographic universality;
- Universality of appeal or catering to all 
tastes and interests;
- Catering for the interests of minorities;
- Universality of payment;
- The sense of national identity and 
community;
- Detachment from all vested interest and 
government;
-  Competition around sound programming 
rather than in increasing audience 
numbers;
- Public guidelines to liberate program 
makers rather than restrict them.
The first principle, geographic universality, 
declares that broadcast programmes 
should be available to all. The second 
principle, the universality of appeal or 
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catering to all tastes and interests, 
establishes that PSB should appeal to the 
mass audience and cater to all tastes and 
interests: regarding program genre, target 
audience and subject matter (Banerjee & 
Seneviratne, 2006, p. 20). Others again have 
proposed that diversity and universality 
are equivalent terms in the sense that PSB 
should aim to make “popular programmes” 
good and “good programmes popular” 
(White et al., 1987a, p. 2). The third 
principle, catering for the interests of 
minorities, positions PSBs in a special 
relationship to the needs and interests of 
the minority groups: including minorities 
of taste, minorities, disadvantaged in the 
wider society, young children, the poor 
and needy, people with special needs, the 
elderly and those of different race, cultural 
or religious background. The universality of 
payment, the fourth principle, signals the 
importance of PSBs being directly funded 
by the corpus of users, namely the BBC’s 
license fee system. The fifth principle 
refers to a sense of national identity and 
community. PSB is commonly expected 
to reflect the national identity, providing 
a forum for all citizens to express their 
needs, concerns and interests, creating a 
shared sense of national identity (White 
et al., 1987a, p. 2). The sixth principle, 
detachment from all vested interest 
and government, relates directly to the 
independence of PSB. This principle 
implies the need for strong institutional 
governance arrangements for maintaining 
independence and freedom of expression 
in PSB. Independence as a key attribute 
of PSB is intended to shield the system 
from political pressures and commercial 
interests, both in programming and 
news coverage thereby serving “plurality 
of opinions and an impartial, informed 
electorate” (Banerjee & Seneviratne, 2006, 
p. 19). The seventh principle, competition 
around good programming rather than in 
increasing audience numbers, emphasises 
competition amongst producers for quality 
programming rather than for audience 
ratings, a critical challenge for public 
service systems in a pluralist society 
(Born, 2004, p. 79; Nissen, 2006, pp. 65-
82). The eighth and final principle, public 
guidelines to liberate program makers 
rather than restrict them, acknowledges 
the importance of the free flow of ideas 
and opinions, freedom of expression, 
experimentation and innovation. To 
ensure such freedoms, it is important 
that regulations are “permissible and not 
restrictive” (White et al., 1987a, p. 2).
These principles for PSB reflect the 
delicate relationship between media and 
citizens, mass taste and minority interests, 
the demands of audience and autonomy 
of the broadcaster along with its duty to 
serve the public interest. 
Serving Social Cohesion, 
Citizenship, National Identity 
& Democracy
PSB has had two broad social functions 
to perform. The first one is to expose the 
entire nation to the more delicate aspects 
of culture. And the second one is to inform 
the whole population, thus enhancing 
their ability to exercise citizenship in a 
variety of ways including national elections 
(Jacka, 2002, p. 331). The media’s role in 
guaranteeing citizen participation means 
providing full access to the broadest range 
of information to facilitate participation 
(Murdock, 1992, p. 21). This concept of 
“media citizenship” is based on a theory 
that the public can be engaged via media 
resources that contribute to their national 
and cultural identity, thereby establishing 
a foundation for their participation as 
active citizens, rather than being passive 
consumers (Schudson, 1994). While PSBs 
are widely perceived to deliver resources for 
full media citizenship, private commercial 
broadcasters, driven by the need to 
make a profit, are regarded as focusing 
on consumer satisfaction rather than 
the needs of citizens (Freedman, 2008); 
although, with globalisation, definitions are 
shifting. 
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Spigelman (2012) asserts that it is a 
defining characteristic of PSB to treat 
its audience as citizens and not as 
consumers, an assessment also supported 
by Rumphorst (1998, p. 3). While it is 
common for organisations to treat people 
as consumers, Rumphorst points out that 
“the person’s interest as a ‘consumer’ 
is only one part of the person’s status 
as a citizen” consumers have desires or 
needs whereas citizens have “rights and 
duties” (Spigelman, 2012). The relevant 
public interest of these discursive figures 
of consumer and citizen has been the 
focus of a longstanding debate in the 
field of media and communication (Clarke, 
Newman & Smith, 2007). This discussion 
is closely connected to the concept of PSB 
independence, with freedom from vested 
interests deemed critical to the delivery 
of impartial information and analysis 
necessary for citizenship (Murdock, 1992). 
PSB has had two broad social 
functions to perform. The first 
one is to expose the entire nation 
to the more delicate aspects of 
culture. And the second one is 
to inform the whole population, 
thus enhancing their ability to 
exercise citizenship
Describing PSBs as the agora, drawing 
connections to early Greek democracy, 
Tony Mary (2004, p. 94) noted that “public 
service broadcasters, independent of 
political and commercial pressures, are a 
guarantee of independent, trustworthy 
and impartial information.” However, free 
speech is essential for PSB for providing 
resources through which both “individual 
and collective identities are constituted”, 
thus providing “a common culture and 
constructing the un-coerced opinion of 
civil society”, independently of “political 
influence” (Dahlgren, 1995; Nolan, 2006, 
p. 229). Censorship by the government 
is one of the external constraints on free 
expression explored by Isalah Berlin (1969) 
in his lecture on “Two Concepts of Liberty” 
— negative and positive freedom. In 1989, 
referencing the dependency of British 
broadcasters on government, Rupert 
Murdoch asserted that such dependency 
results in “less than independent, 
neutered journalism” (Murdoch, 1989). 
A counter-argument to this notes that 
non-commercial government-funded 
space is a better platform for protecting 
journalism independence and that such 
area cannot be provided by the business 
(Smith, 2002, p. 287). McNair (2011, p. 46) 
also argues that whether the threat comes 
from political or economic interests, it is 
vital for the civil society that PSBs remain 
independent from all external vested 
interests, to maintain the professional 
ethics of objectivity in reporting and to 
distance opinions from factual reporting.
However, as Mulgan (2003, p. 1) notes, 
with independence comes power and 
there is always a suspicion of abuse of 
this power by public institutions. Thus, the 
independence of PSBs, in their capacity 
as public institutions defending the public 
interest, calls for public accountability. Even 
though accountability is a slippery term 
(Muller, 2005, p. 42), with many definitions, 
holding PSBs accountable usually means 
making them responsible for finances, 
fairness, and performance. In this context, 
focusing on the relationship between PSB 
and government, the following section, 
explores the impact of neo-liberal policies 
on broadcasting regulation and PSB. 
Neo-Liberalism, 
Digitalization 
and Deregulation
Global media and communications 
technologies now connect people across 
the world, crosscutting the boundaries of 
nation-states, enabling a dynamic global 
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marketplace and contributing to the 
emergence of a sophisticated transnational 
culture (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012, p. 1). 
Tomlinson (1999) defines globalisation 
as “an empirical condition of the modern 
world” while Lunt and Livingstone (2012, 
p. 1) refer to it as complex connectivity, 
noting “globalisation refers to the rapidly 
developing […] network of interconnections 
and interdependencies that characterise 
modern social life”. In the new digital and 
online environment, the PSB goals devised 
by Reith — “to inform, educate and 
entertain” — have evolved and expanded 
with Dyke’s addition of “connect” (Born, 
2004, p. 486).
Digitalization has brought in a new wave 
of on-demand media enabling television 
via the internet (Internet Protocol TV), 
and user-generated content (UGC), forms 
which are characterised by always-on 
availability and global reach (Thompson, 
2006). To make their content more 
convenient, relevant and available, PSBs 
have started narrowcasting via digital 
on-demand forms such as podcasts, and 
vodcasts (Debrett, 2010, p. 197). These 
new delivery modes constitute a shift 
towards the economics of niche audiences 
away from addressing the audience as 
citizens, creating tensions between the 
market and public service values. If PSBs 
are to retain public trust such tensions need 
to be openly acknowledged and addressed 
in governance structures to maintain 
public accountability (Feintuck & Varney 
2006, p. 40). The complex connectivity 
of globalisation and digitalisation 
discussed earlier has led to deregulation, 
thereby challenging government control 
over markets, social life and culture in 
keeping with the individualism underlying 
neo-liberal economic policies (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2012, p. 2).
In the 1980s, widespread adoption of neo-
liberal economic philosophy, along with the 
emergence of multi-channel technologies, 
prompted questions about the relevance 
of PSB (Freedman, 2008; Hamelink, 2002) 
and opened new user-pays models of 
production6 and distribution  (Debrett 
6 - The neo-liberal ideological position is that the 
“market will create, generate and support on its own, 
without any necessary government funding” elimina-
ting the need for public investment in broadcasting (Jolly, 
2011, p. 35).
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2010, p. 16). Neo-liberalism favours 
consumer sovereignty, an ideological 
concept that deems the consumer to be 
sovereign of their consumption by their 
pay for it, an idea, which is the antithesis 
of PSB (Makwana, 2006). Hence, as noted 
by many, neo-liberalism is at odds with 
the rationales for PSB particularly that of 
“offering universal access and coverage” 
to citizens. With the implementation of 
neo-liberal policies, citizens are treated 
unequally as consumers depending on 
their spending power (Knoll, 2012, p. 71). It 
runs counter to the equality of opportunity 
for citizenship promised by PSB (Feintuck 
& Varney, 2006, p. 19). Therefore, in 
respect to its social and civic role, PSM/
PSB needs to devise ways of ensuring that 
the cornucopia of information becomes 
“accessible to all the citizens and is not only 
packed as market commodities or targeted 
to elites” (Price & Raboy, 2003, p. 206). 
Further, neo-liberal ideological tendencies 
represent PSBs as little more than liabilities 
for the public purse, fuelling contemporary 
debates about their funding (White et al., 
1987, p. 4). Advocates of neo-liberalism 
support the deregulation of markets and 
argue that the market should be left to 
regulate itself, with regulatory agencies 
only as a last resort. The interests at stake 
are not just pecuniary or technological but in 
the case of media and communications are 
also social, cultural and most importantly 
democratic (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012, 
p. 18). With the convergence of the 
telecommunications and broadcasting 
sectors, statutory, regulatory bodies have 
also been merged giving rise to super-
regulators such as Ofcom in the UK and 
ACMA in Australia. Since the centralisation 
of regulatory control within a single entity 
in these converged sectors, some have 
argued that commercial and publicly 
funded broadcasters should be regulated 
under the same systems. The defence of 
dedicated regulation for PSBs, outside the 
market regulator, may well be critical for 
the future of PSB independence.
The next part of this article will discuss the 
notion of independence in the context of 
PSBs, in relation to two concepts: de jure 
and de facto.
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Part 2:
Concept of Independence 
for Public Service Broadcasters
In English and German, the concept of 
independence is interpreted in a negative 
sense, as “the absence of dependence” 
(Schulz, 2013, p. 5), which leads Schulz (2013, 
p. 5) to suggest that “autonomy” would be 
the most suitable positive synonym. Dreyer 
(2013, p. 114) defines independence as the 
antonym of “dependence”, implying “freedom 
from the control of influence of another or 
others”, meaning “no externally imposed 
constraints”, and “immunity from arbitrary 
exercise of authority”. The dependency of 
broadcasters, on the external factors of 
social interaction with their audience and 
other media players, as well as their financial 
resources, knowledge and external regulation 
may make it impossible for them to achieve 
absolute autonomy (Dreyer, 2013, p. 117). 
Thus, independence in an institutional and 
social context is accepted and understood as 
a relative not perfect concept. In line with this 
proposition, the article argues that the two 
sides to independence de jure and de facto 
are invariably distinct from one another, yet 
cannot exist without the other. These two 
aspects of independence will be discussed 
in the next section.
Independence, according to Klimkiewicz 
(2013, p. 190) minimises the “external 
dependency” of PSB/PSM on the “political 
realm, the media market (specifically the 
role of advertising and sponsorship) and 
the socio-cultural environment (support 
and claims of various social groups)”. The bi-
polar relationship between independence/
autonomy and external dependency exists 
because their meanings “are associated with 
both value-ridden and value-free qualities” 
(Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 190).  Independence/ 
autonomy may minimise the external 
dependency of PSBs on economic and 
political factors, but it may also minimise their 
dependency on certain positive determinants 
such as “the public” and “the audience” 
(Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 190). It has been argued 
that this might undermine the relationship of 
PSBs to “the public”, jeopardising the entire 
concept of PSB. 
White, McDonnell and Way (1987a) propose 
that although the principle of independence 
is fundamental for PSBs, it could potentially 
imperil democracy. They suggest that the 
rules governing the negative determinants 
of PSB/PSM external dependency — 
political and economic influences — are 
ambiguous and opaque since it is not clear 
what constitute legitimate political pressures 
(White et al., 1987a). Thus, it is argued that 
independence and regulatory theory are 
not two different concepts but two various 
features of the same idea (Schulz, 2013, p. 6). 
Koehane and Nye (2000) observe a gradual 
shift away from the “regulation paradigm” 
to the “concept of governance” that refers 
to a system of norms, rules, laws, protocols, 
charters, agreements and guidelines to direct 
and restrict the activities of any institution 
not always conducted by the government.
Under the governance approach, the 
independence of an object or institution can 
be assessed by analysing “dependencies” 
and “autonomies” that refer respectively to 
“factors that enable another object to control 
the object of which the independence is in 
question and the factors that make it more 
likely for that object to act according to its 
own rules rather than giving in to pressure 
from outside” (Schulz, 2013, p. 7). Dreyer 
(2013) compares this to the concept of 
autonomy and its two types – de jure or 
formal independence and de facto or actual 
independence — mentioned previously.
Types of Independence:
De jure and De facto 
The preceding discussion explains that 
within any governance structure, the 
concept of independence is not only 
governed by the regulations laid down in 
the formal law but also by “dependencies” 
and “autonomies” based on social norms 
35
rather than formal regulations (Gilardi, 
2008, p. 4; Schulz, 2013, p. 8). This 
approach focuses the discourse around 
independence on two iterations — de 
jure and de facto aspects of independence 
(Gilardi, 2008, p. 4; Schulz, 2013, p. 8). 
The normative framework that constrains 
any potential external interference in 
institutional operations establishes the de 
jure independence of an institution (Schulz, 
2013, p. 9). Here, the normative framework 
refers to all the provisions, standards and 
procedures that are embedded in written 
codes, laws, bylaws, agreements, charters, 
guidelines, regulations and similar legal 
documents (Dreyer, 2013, p. 122), which 
direct or restrict the activities of any 
institution (Koehane & Nye, 2000, p. 6). The 
degree to which this governance system 
works to shield the institution against 
threats or inducements is its de jure 
independence. In the field of PSM/PSB, all 
these elements of governance contribute 
to the autonomy of the broadcasters de 
jure independence. However, the concept 
of autonomy, similar to independence, is 
never an absolute concept. There is always 
an element of external dependency and 
potential challenges to this institutional 
independence. In the case of PSM, it may 
be characterised through a competitive and 
complementary relationship with other 
actors in the media landscape (Blumber & 
Hoffmann-Riem, 2002). 
Competition amongst media players 
arises in some circumstances: the size of 
the market, a share of viewership, quality, 
innovation, professionalism, standards, 
social relevance and serving the public 
interest. However, complementary 
functions arise due to the narrowing 
imperatives of media markets: preserving 
the social values neglected by other media 
actors (commercial media), providing 
overall quality and diversity to the 
audiences (Blumber & Hoffmann-Reim, 
2002), and forming an enlarged public 
opinion through representativeness and 
impartiality (Arendt, 1958). Therefore, 
the independence that is enjoyed by an 
institution according to the law (de jure) 
is likely to be different from the reality of 
actual practice (de facto independence), 
due to external dependency leading to 
various constraints. 
(...) the independence that 
is enjoyed by an institution 
according to the law (de jure) is 
likely to be different from the 
reality of actual practice (de facto 
independence), due to external 
dependency leading to various 
constraints.
De facto independence is defined 
by Maggetti (2007) as the practical 
independence of agencies to manage their 
day-to-day regulatory actions. This term 
can also be extrapolated from Majone’s 
seminal paper (Majone, 1997). In this 
paper, de facto independence is referred 
in the context of regulatory authorities as 
“the autonomy enjoyed by them in their 
decision-making process”, while Nordlinger 
(1987, p. 361) presents it as an “autonomy 
to be able to translate one’s preferences 
into authoritative actions, without external 
constraints”. Hanretty (2010) a leading 
researcher in this field, consolidates these 
features of de facto independence within 
the framework of PSB and defines de facto 
independence from political influence:
The degree to which PSB employees take 
day-to-day decisions about their output or 
the output of their subordinates, without 
receiving and acting based on instructions, 
threats or other inducements from 
politicians, or the anticipations thereof; 
considering whether the interest of those 
politicians would be harmed by choices 
about output (Hanretty, 2010, p. 76).
There have been different opinions about 
the relationship between these two 
aspects of independence. Irion and Ledger 
observe that de facto independence 
cannot be entirely separated from formal 
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independence as the two complement 
each other at least to the degree that the 
actual situation complies with the legal 
provisions (Irion and Ledger, 2013). The 
term de facto independence, however, is 
not limited to the type of compliance as 
it requires further delegation of powers, 
organisational autonomy and the absence 
of external constraints or influence (Irion 
and Ledger, 2013). Gilardi and Maggetti 
(2011, p. 2) and Baudrier (2001, p. 
7) assume that de jure and de facto 
independence do not necessarily coincide 
with another point of view which is in line 
with system theory7 and one of the leading 
positions of discussion regarding these 
two aspects in this paper. 
The next two sections of this part evaluate 
common characteristics of de jure and de 
facto independence.
Evaluating De Jure Independence 
Due to the tangible nature of de jure 
independence, its formal criteria, as 
discussed earlier, are the primary assets 
for any assessment of the regulatory 
independence of an organisation (Irion & 
Ledger, 2013, p. 144). As already explained, 
for PSB/PSM (and MRAs), any assessment 
of “independence” must consider the 
relationship between autonomy and 
external dependency across time in any 
given culture and geographical context 
(Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 192).
The interaction between PSBs and their 
external cultural and geographic context is 
necessary to identify those factors most 
likely to weaken PSB independence (Dreyer, 
2013, p. 120). Adopting this strategy, 
Dreyer (2013, p. 126) recommends five 
criteria for evaluating independence: 
i) “status and power”; ii) “autonomy of 
decision makers”; iii) “financial autonomy”; 
iv) “knowledge”; and v) “transparency and 
accountability mechanisms”. Gilardi (2001, 
2002, 2005, 2005a, 2008) notes that the 
credibility of the regulator (which can be 
referred to as a broadcaster in case of PSB 
internal self-regulatory processes) is linked 
to its formal independence. Drawing on the 
model of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 
(1992) Gilardi identifies key dimensions of 
formal independence: “the status of the 
head of the agency, […] the status of the 
management board […] the relationship 
with the government and legislature, and 
the financial and organisational autonomy” 
(as cited in Irion & Ledger, 2013, p. 145). 
Assessing the operation and independence 
of PSB/PSM in Poland, Klimkiewicz (2013, 
p. 192) categorises the criteria mentioned 
above into four dimensions of autonomy 
and external dependency: i) appointment 
procedures and management; ii) 
accountability; iii) financing mechanisms; 
and iv) performance.
Klimkiewicz’s model for assessing de jure 
independence, albeit a quantitative one, 
offers the most recent research approach 
and integrates all factors raised by other 
researchers.
Identifying the board appointment 
procedure and role of management are 
particularly important in measuring the 
formal independence of a broadcaster, 
Klimkiewicz (2013, p. 193) argues that when 
appropriately managed, board composition 
can be guaranteed as fair and independent 
without any vested political or economic 
interests. Recruitment of management and 
governing board members should be based 
on professional requirements rather than 
external power/influence (Klimkiewicz, 2013, 
p. 193). There are two particularly important 
factors involved in the appointment of board 
members: first the guaranteed security of 
board-membership tenure (to alleviate 
7 - This theory states that the functions of autonomous media systems such as PSB institutions can only be fulfilled if 
there is absolute factual (de facto) autonomy that is not normative (de jure) or pre-conditional (Luhman, 1997, p.707). 
But this does not undermine the importance of normative concepts in protecting the factual independence against 
interference and guarding the functions of a specific institution, which in this case are the PSBs (Schulz, 2013, p.8).
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the fear of government retaliation taming 
board actions), and second the protection 
of remuneration from political manipulation 
(Mendel, 2000).
However, the independence of a board is 
not the same as editorial independence, 
which is the fundamental mission of de 
jure provisions. All rules and regulations 
must support freedom in the day-to-
day editorial decisions, preserving these 
from any interference from the board of 
Trustees.8 The latter, Mendel observes, 
should liaise with the broadcaster and 
government without compromising 
editorial independence (Mendel, 2000).
The independence of PSBs can be assessed 
through the prism of appointment 
procedures and management. At the 
same time, the normative fundamentals 
and functioning of these procedures and 
management within each broadcasting 
institution reflect the dimension of 
accountability. In this sense, as Klimkiewicz 
(2013, p. 193) notes, prompts the question 
- what kind of accountability and to whom? 
Accountability is essential for PSBs, 
ensuring that they remain faithful to their 
public service obligations/responsibilities 
and the public interest (Mendel, 2000). But 
this invites questions about who PSBs are 
accountable to and in what proportions 
and about which mechanisms ensure such 
accountability. Broadcaster accountability 
comes in various kinds, for example, 
administrative accountability, which implies 
that superiors are answerable (Klimkiewicz, 
2013, p. 193). Blind (2011) notes various 
mechanisms for ensuring administrative 
accountability such as auditing, evaluation 
or other oversight measures for monitoring 
performance and the implementation of 
management requirements as detailed in 
law, rules or regulations.
Goetz and Gaventa (2001, p. 7) suggest 
another form of accountability - legal 
accountability. It is directly linked to the rule 
of law where the judiciary keeps a check 
on the actions of officials and managers 
and guarantees that they act within the 
“mandates of their legally prescribed 
competencies” (as cited in Klimkiewicz, 
2013, p. 193). Legal accountability is not only 
ensured from sources outside but also from 
within the corporation by the board9 or the 
trustees who are responsible for assessing 
its performance to provide a high degree of 
objectivity, a point discussed below.
Additionally, Blind (2011, p. 7; cited in 
Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 194) mentions a 
form of political accountability, which he 
defines as “the obligation of the elected 
officials to answer to the public, and of the 
public servants to answer to the elected 
officials and is ensured through elections 
and the legislative system…” In the context 
of PSB, this refers to the accountability of 
the board to the main legislative body or 
Parliament (Mendel, 2000), usually through 
the “annual reports”10. Another form of 
accountability is social accountability, which 
relates to the engagement of citizens 
in public affairs through various direct/
indirect civil society initiatives (Klimkiewicz, 
2013, p. 194). It refers to how PSBs stay in 
touch with public opinion — through polls, 
surveys, seminars, regular public meetings 
and advisory committees (Mendel, 
2000). Along with these resources, PSB 
online portals also provide a platform for 
audiences and broadcasters to connect and 
interact directly with each other, marking 
the transition of PSB to PSM. However, 
this platform also brings challenges — 
new accusations of unfair competition with 
commercial broadcasters and the issues of 
moderating user-generated online content 
8 - BBC board members are now designated as The Trustees after changes brought to the BBC’s structure in 2005.
9 - Directors take fiduciary responsibility.
10 - The reports contain information about the following matters of PSBs: financial accounting, audited accounts, 
information about its compliance system and likewise (Mendel, 2000).
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— which will be discussed below. This 
matter of finding a balance between public 
participation as being accountable and 
editorial accountability for the nature and 
quality of user-generated content (UGC) 
is one of the most critical issues for PSB 
accountability.
The complaints process is one of 
the principal tools for delivering this 
accountability. The complaints system 
also serves legal accountability, although 
it is arguably more relevant to PSBs’ social 
responsibility to address public grievances 
about serving the public. The structure 
of the complaints system is one of the 
components of de jure independence but 
the actual decisions undertaken to reflect 
de facto independence. Further, the more 
the complaints made, the more de facto 
independence is established. Thus, the de 
jure and de facto editorial, administrative 
and regulatory independence of PSBs 
to broadcast, while maintaining a safe 
distance from external political and 
financial constraints, is guaranteed by 
their rigorous accountability mechanisms 
(Sharma, 2015, p. 142).
The next dimension of independence is 
funding. There is a range of overlapping 
broadcasting models of ownership and 
control, from state-controlled to public 
service broadcaster, to private commercial 
ownership (Buckley et al., 2008, p. 35). 
Each of these models is defined by the 
unique dynamics in which they exist and 
the different methods by which they are 
funded. One amongst them is PSB model, 
which is independent of both governmental 
and commercial interests and is directed to 
serve the public interest. It operates under 
statutes explicitly sanctioning editorial 
independence, freedom of expression 
and sovereign governance arrangements. 
It also renders financial independence to 
PSBs, while making them accountable to 
the public. This raises another proposition, 
that funding might be a criterion by which 
to measure the independence of the PSB, 
although not the sole criterion. 
Financing mechanisms affect the quality 
of the broadcasting and the autonomy 
of the broadcaster (Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 
194). But Barnett and Docherty (1987) 
claim there is no evidence that the method 
of direct funding, such as that of the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 
allows for any more political interference 
in programming and news that the license 
fee method like that of the BBC.  In this 
vein, White, McDonnell and Way (1987) 
argue the independence of PSBs is not 
determined by the method of financing but 
rather by political pressure, which is one of 
the few factors differentiating de jure and 
de facto independence. Thus, the funding 
of PSBs should be substantial, predictable 
and must guarantee their independence 
from the political and commercial 
pressures while upholding PSB values 
which is their prime responsibility. It is a 
central argument for this paper underlining 
the various rationales, and the different 
dimensions of PSB independence as 
discussed above. 
Further, the complementary and competitive 
functions of PSB/PSM, as explained earlier, 
differentiate them from the market-driven 
media (Klimkiewicz, 2013, p. 194). Such 
differences, evident in the Charter provisions 
for informing, entertaining and educating are 
assessable as performance or programming, 
the fourth dimension of independence 
(Blumber & Hoffmann-Reim, 2002, p. 207).
Editorial independence is evidenced by the 
fair and impartial news and current affairs 
an integral aspect of the civic role of the 
PSBs commonly referred to the “flagship” 
of PSB and widely acknowledged in 
Charter aims for freedom from the “vested 
interests of commerce or government.” 
The distinguishing quality of PSB news 
that makes it so valuable is public trust 
(Debrett, 2010, p. 188). Trust as defined 
by Bakir and Barlow (2007, p. 110) is a 
“complex phenomenon comprising many 
subtleties with three features as its core 
— rationality, faith and confidence.” And 
as Biltereyst (2004, p. 342) explains, there 
is a close connection between public trust 
and the traditional PSB ethos and values 
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of impartiality, independence, diversity, 
quality, truth, integrity and accuracy.
PSB/PSM has played an active role in 
engaging and building the trust of the 
public, by delivering diverse special interest 
programming and providing a platform for 
interactions, to bridge a gap between social 
and cultural differences and therefore 
proving the public value of the broadcasting 
(Giddens, 1994, p. 186; Bardoel & Brants 
2003, p. 169; Debrett, 2010, p. 206).  With 
the introduction of new digital platforms, 
PSBs in transitioning to PSM changed 
how citizens are informed: the public now 
interacting with content providers online 
(Cinque, 2007, p. 97), and by extension 
through the social networking activities of 
these broadcasters. 
However, PSM faces various challenges 
with the emergence of this new on-
demand, interactive, cross-platform 
programming and the influence of neo-
liberal policies. One of those problems, the 
accusation of unfair competition comes 
from private providers of new media 
businesses that fear losing audience share 
and advertising revenue (Jolly, 2011, p. 21). 
Another challenge for PSB content online 
is its moderation. There are ambiguities 
associated with the regulation/moderation 
of the online content of PSBs, such as 
the use of external hyperlinks, global 
availability, and the compromising of 
editorial independence and integrity that 
comes with open public commentary. Many 
of these were raised by a 2000 Senate 
inquiry into ABC online over the ABC’s 
negotiations with Telstra for expanding 
ABC’s services and building more revenue, 
a deal that was terminated following public 
disclosure (ABC, 2000).  Such expanded 
interactive potential of PSM/PSB is a 
threat to the delicate relationship between 
the audience and the broadcaster and that 
“the most valuable asset is public trust” 
(Debrett, 2010, p. 215). Somehow PSM/
PSB must manage and moderate its online 
content to preserve both user interactivity 
and that investment of public trust on 
which continuation of public funding 
depends. In this regard, various measures 
are mentioned in conclusion, adopted by 
the BBC and the ABC for moderation of 
their own UGC in their newsrooms. 
Evaluating 
De Facto Independence 
The evaluation of de facto independence 
relies mostly on (qualitative) social science 
research methods such as expert surveys, 
as recommended by Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyapti (1992). Existing literature indicates 
that measuring independence in practice 
— de facto independence — is difficult 
as it often cannot be substantiated by 
empirical evidence (Irion & Ledger, 2013, 
p.146). Pedersen and Sorensen (2004) 
suggest conducting semi-structured 
interviews whereas Maggetti (2007) 
proposes media content analysis for 
assessing the regulator’s reputation (Irion 
& Ledger, 2013, p. 146). Maggetti’s (2007) 
“reputation” or Gilardi’s (2002) “credibility 
of the regulatory body” is among the 
functions of de facto independence which 
are extremely hard to measure objectively 
(Irion and Ledger 2013, p. 146). 
Empirical research on the evaluation of 
de facto independence is often conducted 
via suitable proxies as indicators of de 
facto independence, but these vary widely 
according to data and assumptions (Irion 
and Ledger, 2013, p. 146).  It is difficult 
to identify the indicators of de facto 
independence, such as those leading to the 
politicisation of PSB board appointments 
(Gilardi, 2002; Hanretty and Koop, 2012). 
De jure and De facto
Independence: Relationship 
in Public Broadcasting Sector
Four factors differentiate the two sides 
of PSB independence according to 
Hanretty (2009, p. 17). These factors also 
40
elucidate political autonomy with three 
of the four derived from existing media 
studies scholarship (Hanretty, 2010). 
The first element refers to bureaucratic 
partisanship. Surviving in the same 
normative framework and same political 
arena signifies that PSBs will share some 
standard features with the government 
bureaucracy (Hanretty, 2010). Hanretty 
(2009, p. 17) noticed that in the model 
of political-bureaucracy which includes 
party-politicisation, bureaucrats are used 
to receiving and either accepting or denying 
the partisan orders from the politicians 
according to their professional norms.
Hanretty’s (2009, p. 39) next reason, which 
potentially creates the difference between de 
jure and de facto aspects of independence, is 
the size of the news market, which refers not 
to the sector’s total profitability, but rather to 
overall consumption. Hanretty (2009, pp. 39-
44) also proposed that “the larger the market 
for news in each country, the more likely 
journalists in that country are to embark on 
a professionalisation project, producing rules 
which raise their status”.  However, the size of 
news market is considered only to the extent 
that larger markets may better enable highly 
professional journalists to move into top 
executive positions and become responsible 
for formulating the rules or guidelines for 
their profession.  Recruitment of journalists 
with a less professional approach implies a 
lowering of professional standards that may 
well only defend ideas held by “particular 
identifiable groups of the society” (Hanretty, 
2009, pp. 39-44). 
The factor of the size of the markets 
could also be understood regarding the 
free market ethos of neo-liberalism that 
challenge PSB through deregulation and 
the user-pays models of media production 
and distribution. The rise of neo-liberalism 
and the consequent significance of these 
markets are contributing factors to the space 
between the de jure and de facto aspects of 
PSB independence because of the pressure 
it places on publicly funded media. 
Party-system polarisation, Hanretty 
(2010) suggests, also affects the 
independence of broadcasters. This view 
is reflected in the claim of Oliver Whitley, 
chief assistant to the BBC Director-
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General, that “the nation divided always 
has the BBC on the rack” (Briggs, 1979). 
Thus, “the party-polarisation has been 
cited both as a correlate of media systems 
and as a specific explanation of low levels 
of independence in PSBs” (Hanretty, 2010). 
It has been observed that the ruling party 
always makes claims of bias against the 
PSB, with their views changing once they 
move to the opposition (Jolly, 2011, p. 26). 
Hanretty (2009) also notes that de jure 
independence is sometimes used as a 
proxy for de facto independence which 
makes the concept of de jure independence 
unclear and blurs differences between 
the two. The de jure independence of the 
broadcaster rests in its legal provisions. 
These may invoke the moral suasion, which 
implies that the politicians and journalists 
feel their commitment to maintaining 
independence with the acceptance of 
these regulations; or they might create 
space for independent behaviour (Hanretty, 
2010). This autonomous behaviour could 
refer to PSBs taking independent decisions 
regarding management, programming, 
funding or their self-regulatory systems. 
Regarding politicians, it relates to 
interventions sanctions, rewards and 
appointments, those who rely on the “legal 
possibilities open to politicians in virtue of 
their office” (Hanretty, 2009, p. 33). 
Apart from these direct legal interventions, 
politicians might also intervene indirectly 
by writing letters to the PSB criticising 
its coverage, by meeting management 
members to discuss issues; by threatening 
to induce funding cuts or organising 
licensee fee non-payment campaigns and 
likewise (Hanretty, 2009, p. 33). Indirect 
intervention, according to Hanretty (2009, 
p. 34) may not be as intimidating to 
broadcasters as the legal interventions 
because “indirect” intervention depends 
on the “politicians” ability to take further 
legal actions. Such methods can have a 
psychological effect on the broadcaster, 
however, triggering consciousness 
amongst the executives or journalist 
against repeating such incidents (Hanretty, 
2009, p. 34).
(...) it is argued that the political 
and economic interventions can 
each contribute to the disparity 
between de jure and de facto 
aspects of independence.
In conclusion, it is argued that the political 
and economic interventions can each 
contribute to the disparity between de 
jure and de facto aspects of independence. 
Furthermore, as drawn from the preceding 
arguments, that although digital platforms 
have introduced a new element of 
accountability for the PSM/PSB, there are 
still many issues related to the content 
moderation of audience interaction due 
to its spontaneity, ambiguity and the 
hidden possibilities in it for commercial 
exploitation. The latter subsequently 
intensify political and financial pressures 
and risking public trust in these institutions 
(Debrett, 2010, pp. 214-216). It may also 
increase the space between de jure and de 
facto aspects of independence of PSBs. 
The following conclusion offers 
recommendations and suggestions about 
how this disparity might be narrowed to 
better defend the independence of PSB 
system in the future for ensuring its public 
service obligations/ responsibilities.
Part 3:
Conclusion
The previous section found that political 
and economic intervention could each 
contribute to the disparity between de 
jure and de facto aspects of independence. 
The accountability mechanisms for better 
shielding the public broadcasting sector 
from all external vested interests, both 
political and economic rationale of PSB 
along with the appropriate moderation 
protocols to manage public interaction 
online, are needed as “independence and 
accountability are inter-dependent and any 
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alterations to the accountability apparatus 
appears to affect the de jure and de facto 
aspects of independence exercised by the 
PSBs in their roles.” (Sharma, 2015, p. 143) 
The following conclusion, based on the 
research findings of this paper, offers three 
recommendations and suggestions about 
how this disparity might be narrowed to 
better defend the independence of the 
PSB systems in the future by increasing 
their accountability which is necessary for 
performing their social responsibilities. 
1. Legislation, PSBs and De jure and De 
facto Independence 
The legislation governing PSBs needs 
to grant these institutions genuine 
independence and protection. The 
rigorously drafted law is one of the most 
effective ways to depoliticise the boards 
of PSBs and guarantee both de jure and 
de facto independence while eliminating 
bureaucratic partisanship and party 
politicisation. The above arguments of 
this paper established several factors to 
be considered in drafting PSB legislation.11 
Legislation should set out the powers 
and duties of the board members, panel 
members, regulators and the principles of 
good governance to be followed by them for 
upholding transparent and fair procedures. 
It is necessary for maintaining arm’s length 
independence from government and other 
factors that narrow the space between the 
two sides of independence. 
In this context, the second recommendation 
is the enhancement of public engagement 
in the matters of governance of PSBs for 
maintaining their public accountability, 
which is again required in the interests of 
narrowing the disparity between de jure 
and de facto independence. 
2. Enhancing Public Engagement 
The advent of digitalisation and PSM has 
brought new methods for producing and 
presenting news including user-generated 
content (UGC), enabling public participation 
in the news production process and serving 
PSB charter directives to be innovative 
(Jolly, 2011, p. 23). Public participation is 
a key for upholding public trust in PSB 
institutions (Debrett, 2010, p. 216). The 
higher an institution ranks in surveys of 
public trust, the more independent it is 
deemed to be (Bakir & Barlow, 2007, p. 
5). The integration of UGC into PSB online 
content and TV programming offers a more 
demonstrative form of public participation 
and accountability. PSBs such as ABC 
have subsequently developed multi-
level moderation systems to manage 
interactions and protect their different 
audiences online.
Empowering the public by enabling them 
to contribute to news bulletins, UGC also 
offers a means of building engagement 
with youth audiences, accustomed 
to sharing via social media. However, 
maintaining editorial values across blended 
professional/amateur (ProAm) content 
such as this requires the execution of very 
skilled judgement, given the need for speed 
and currency and the risks of accidental or 
deliberate inaccuracy or misinformation in 
public contributions.
The interactive portals of PSBs thus raise 
new issues: the accountability of online 
content; claims that they constitute unfair 
competition for commercial broadcasters, 
and represent a costly and unnecessary 
replication of services provided 
commercially. The content produced via 
UGC and audience participation online does 
challenge professional norms and PSB 
values such as objectivity and impartiality. 
11 - Factors such as the appointments and termination procedures of the board members, knowledge and experience 
of the board members, a separation between matters of policy and execution while forming the broad and the 
selection process of the board members.
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The tension of new interactive services is 
evident in observations about the BBC’s 
editorial system: “techies have gained 
definitional powers in the newsroom and 
have acquired sufficient capital to start 
affecting editorial practices and decisions 
about what to publish of the UGC” (Bélair‐
Gagnon, 2013). Discussing the role of a 
“techie” in the monitoring of PSB values 
such as impartiality, Beliar-Gagnon notes 
that “tech-savvy journalists” are now 
involved in social media-related projects’ 
such as the UGC Hub in the BBC newsroom 
(2013). Besides, “tech-savvy journalists” 
have “appropriated verification processes” 
developed through editorial guidelines 
including social networking guidelines and 
Twitter guidelines. 
In the context of the television newsroom, 
where a speed of delivery is critical, 
integration of UGC puts new stresses on 
fact-checking and assessment of balance 
and other professional norms. Beliar-
Gagnon (2013) observes that embracing 
of the participatory possibilities of digital 
media has resulted in a weakening rather 
than strengthening of accountability 
mechanisms. Such issues have the 
potential to diminish public trust in the 
institutions of PSB. However, it is suggested 
that adequately moderated online UGC 
along with other techniques for eliciting 
public interaction, like polls, surveys and 
focus groups, maintain the accountability 
of PSBs towards their public, contributing 
citizen-generated news and content 
alongside professional services (Bakir & 
Barlow, 2007, p. 84). To exemplify, in 2011, 
new ABC editorial policies and standards 
were introduced for the moderation of UGC 
(ABC, 2011). Three levels of moderation 
are detailed in the ABC online editorial 
policies; these accommodate the needs 
of different audiences by offering varying 
degrees of protection or freedom. The first 
level is the “pre-moderation that enables 
the ABC to manage sites where the risk 
associated with publishing inappropriate 
content is high”. The second level is the 
“post-moderation” where all posts are 
moderated after they appear online and 
the risk of appropriation is low; and the 
third level is labelled “reactive moderation” 
where the posts are only moderated 
if there is an alert from a user for the 
moderator (ABC, 2011). The role of a 
moderator is to keep the interactive space 
open for the public, to editorially justify the 
content and to maintain the consistency 
of external hyperlinks.  In this way, 
moderation enables different categories of 
citizen-consumer to interact directly with 
the broadcaster and each other, enhancing 
the de facto independence of the ABC 
while ensuring that the language and the 
tone of UGC follow PSB values of accuracy, 
impartiality and the expression of critical 
and negative opinions.  
Political will to uphold PSB independence 
offers the most significant protection 
for those broadcasters with well-
developed governance systems for their 
accountability. Both independence and 
accountability (as discussed in previous 
sections) are balanced in PSB governance 
arrangements (Buckley et al., 2008, p. 
197), but this balanced relationship often 
gets disrupted during emergencies by 
state intervention (Hale, 2010, p. 52; 
O’Connor & Delaney, 2009). However, the 
findings of this paper combined, with the 
previous discussion of interactive media 
and UGC, suggest that appropriately 
moderated, enhanced public participation 
offers an effective means of mediating 
state intervention and market pressure 
on PSBs, both of which exacerbate 
disparity between de jure and de facto 
independence. It would enable more sense 
of ownership by the public who fund these 
broadcasters. Public awareness of public 
ownership is established through better 
modes of public engagement with the 
public broadcaster. In the future, this could 
include more sophisticated software that 
better manages online comments threads 
in the public interest, without curtailing free 
expression.  The participatory models of 
communication such as UGC provide space 
for expression, interaction and innovation 
while broadening a broadcaster’s 
representative capacity. PSM needs to 
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embrace such participatory platforms 
more fully by better integrating them into 
mainstream programming while ensuring 
that all governance protocols are also 
adapted satisfactorily, as discussed above.
3. Future Possibilities for PSB Independence
The last recommendation for narrowing 
the disparity between the two sides of 
independence relates to the following:
A) External Regulatory Arrangements of 
PSBs: 
It is recommended that the PSBs 
should be externally regulated by 
commercial regulators, such as Australian 
Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) and Office of Communication 
(Ofcom) (for the ABC and BBC respectively). 
However, as suggested, the external 
regulation of PSBs should be by a non-
governmental accountability body that is 
funded by the industry and cooperates with 
the complaint process. This suggestion 
is similar to the kind of an organisation 
recommended by the Convergence Review 
committee, established in 2011, in its final 
report, that examined “the operation of 
media and communications regulation in 
Australia and assessed its effectiveness in 
achieving appropriate policy objectives for 
the convergent era” (Boreham, 2012).
The committee established a need for an 
independent communications regulator 
that should be a small organisation, which 
does not have to administer the existing 
complex system of broadcasting licensing 
as ACMA does (Boreham, 2012). It further 
suggested that the independent regulator 
should be a statutory body independent of 
government, especially in its staffing and 
finances, so that, it can make decisions 
independent of its political cycle (Boreham, 
2012, p. 15). The regulator, it was also 
proposed, should be able to develop most 
efficient and effective methods for dealing 
with complaints, and the objectives of 
regulation should be stated in its legislation 
for regulator’s accountability towards 
its public. However, the provisions long 
established for public service broadcasting 
were left intact. 
B) Security of Funding:
The final factor, which is essential for the 
independent survival of PSB, is the security 
of financial supply. It is observed that the 
role of the government is to administer 
the revenue from taxation for the budget 
of the PSB, and not to control it (Sharma, 
2015). Arguments have been developed 
favouring various modes of funding, 
but ultimately political will is the crucial 
determinant for PSB independence and 
integrity, rather than the funding model, as 
already established. 
Additionally, a transparent and fair 
appointments procedure that better 
delivers board members of high integrity 
with relevant backgrounds and expertise, 
along with the facilitation of genuine 
public/citizen/audience engagement in the 
matters of PSB governance and funding 
can better safeguard the independence 
and integrity of such broadcasters against 
political/economic attacks. It is also 
essential for the non-bureaucratic and 
non-polarized administration of these 
broadcasters, required for narrowing the 
gap between the de jure and de facto 
aspects of PSB independence. 
Therefore, in conclusion, it appears from 
this research that there is no failsafe 
strategy to shield the independence of 
PSBs in the digital era. The critical factors 
remain careful development of PSB 
charters, to reflect the public interest; 
astute drafting of governance systems 
to best defend these; and engagement 
of the public, in maintaining both public 
accountability from the broadcaster, and 
independent funding supported by the 
government. This field is a dynamic one 
and remains open for further research as 
online interactive platforms expand.
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